Terraforming security review

Date: 2026-11-15 Scope: the ModifyLand handler (crates/welkin-region/src/terraform.rs) and the terrain height channel (crates/welkin-scene/src/terrain.rs).

Finding HIGH-B: non-finite and absurd terrain values

A viewer could send a ModifyLand request with NaN or infinite height or strength. A NaN written into the height field poisons it: the terrain encoder and the physics heightfield both read from it. Commit e441e9e fixes this at two layers.

  • The handler drops the whole request if the target height is not finite or is outside 0 to 4096 m, if the strength (seconds) is not finite or is outside plus or minus 1000, if an extended brush radius is outside 0 to 64 m, or if a coordinate is not finite or has an absolute value above 4096.
  • TerrainChannel::set ignores NaN and infinite heights and keeps the old value, so no other caller can write them either.
  • MEDIUM-C: a viewer could send ModifyLand as fast as it liked. The region now accepts one request per avatar every 20 ms, as OpenSimulator does, and drops the rest (commit 25996f9).
  • HIGH-A: object permission checks used to be bypassed by default. They are now enforced by default, and the estate owner and managers come from the [Estate] config section (commit 416fa77). The handshake reports estate owner and manager status to the viewer.

Other controls

  • Only avatars that pass can_edit_terrain can change the terrain.
  • Unknown brush actions are ignored.
  • Parcel-limited area edits are unsupported and do nothing, so they cannot edit outside the parcel.

Not covered

This review reads the code. It did not test the handler with a live viewer or fuzz the packet decoder.